Someone who was doing some research on the Internet sent this article to me today.    The reader found it and thought it did a good job of clarifying the problem of why Boeing and perhaps some other defense contractors do not appear to be willing to clean up their acts.  I am interested in how Boeing has allegedly co-opted the FAA and others regarding safety practices.  It is an interesting and plausible scenario that if Boeing has operated this way with commercial aircraft manufacturing and business, it likely has used it’s influence through the intense lobbying efforts it uses at all levels of government, and availed itself of the very active Revolving Door between Boeing and governmental agencies, particularly DOD and agencies with oversight responsibilities, to reduce or in some cases eliminate requirements Boeing finds inconvenient, too expensive, or gets in the way of certain people’s ambitious plans.  Read and think on it.  GFS



Why Boeing will never reform itself and end the fraud noted on this site willingly:


After reading this site’s contents you might well be baffled as to why Boeing continues to risk another “Druyun/EELV affair” (although this fraud is many times worse than those matters) and continues to also willingly place at greater risk the lives of the public that fly on Boeing jets because of Boeing’s acceptance of greater “business risk” by the hobbling of Quality, Safety, and Reliability ensuring practices that has placed the vast majority of this extra “Boeing business” risk not on Boeing itself, but on the lives of those passengers and crew who unknowingly (unless they stumble across this site) bear such extra risk solely for Boeing’s quest for ever greater Bottom line value and for whatever part of this “value” gets deducted from Boeing airplane prices and therefore “benefits” airlines (until the inevitable hull loss accident because of this fraud).
The first sign that Boeing does not intend to end this obvious fraud willingly has been proven by Boeing’s actions in my attempts to bring this fraud to their attention in damning detail on multiple occasions. On those occasions Boeing’s actions were just “CYA” extremely limited and biased internal audits that may have made an uninformed person think Boeing had done something, when in fact those audits changed nothing noticeably to end this fraud in order to ensure the “benefits” of the noted fraud continued to add to meeting Boeing’s all-important bottom line maximization goals.
Boeing’s similar and purposeful inaction to end this endemic fraud within the company placing innocent lives at extra risk intentionally for more bottom line dollars after I “broke the story” publicly on this site and in the news media also proves Boeing’s inability to take action themselves to reverse this fraud the company has been willingly fostering for years, no matter how public these crimes ultimately become.

The most powerful motive for Boeing to resist internal reforms seemingly regardless of the consequences is not because of its (by one highly placed management source within the company) self-described status as “the most arrogant company on the face of the planet.” It instead comes to what everything is about at Boeing–the almighty dollar. Boeing is one of the most business plan driven companies in existence. Anything that does not support reaching the business plan’s “targets” is in jeopardy, even if legally and regulatory required, such as Boeing’s compliance with its Production and Type Certificates goes. This explains not only why Boeing intentionally subverted and intentionally did not comply with its minimum quality system and certification requirements as documented on this site–it also explains why Boeing will willingly do nothing to reverse the “gains” to the business plan made by this fraud. 

To reverse this fraud would be much more difficult for Boeing than the actions it had to take to put these fraudulent activities in place. Years of QA manager’s (and their manager’s) and complicit QA Lead’s (now “Team Leaders”) efforts to turn inspectors into mostly just rollerstampers of paperwork would have to be reversed–not an easy or short time span task. Most of the time “leaned out” of production line flow to enable shorter flowtimes and moving lines was time for inspectors to actually inspect the airplanes, which was not necessary in the rollerstamping quality system put in place by Boeing. However, complying with Production Certificate requirements to have inspectors actually inspect per quality system requirements would require much of that time to be added back into the production schedule and/or an unprecedented number of inspectors per mechanic ratio than that of the past. 

Boeing will not take these actions willingly due to their cost (effect on meeting the business plan) and the effect on flowtimes. Indeed, because of the above, I don’t expect Boeing to ever admit any of the corruption I have documented on this site and elsewhere, because to do so would require Boeing to take some action to stop it, which it does not want to do for the aforesaid reasons, among others (effect on their undeserved reputation, etc.).

But if Boeing does fess up to some of these past and present crimes (which will probably happen only because they would calculate greater risks to the company’s bottom line if they did not do so, such as ignoring the results of the ongoing review by the DOT OIG might ultimately bring the company), don’t even then expect Boeing to end this corruption. Just like after the Special Technical Audit of 1999/2000 where they were “caught with their pants down” “violating” many of even of the most basic requirements of the FAA, expect Boeing only to do the minimum they think they can get away with as far as reform until the “problems” (the auditors) go away and Boeing can then do business again as usual. Also expect another tactic used by Boeing during “C/A” after the STA, implementing programs (with the tacit approval of a similarly corrupt FAA) that actually made compliance with its quality system much worse than before the STA, and indeed, in some cases, eliminated unjustifiably the requirements Boeing had violated, rather than Boeing ever complying with those “burdensome” requirements that were in place to ensure quality, safety, and reliability requirements were met, but were “too prescriptive” and therefore had to go to meet Boeing’s overriding goal of enhancing efficiency over everything, including safety.