Tag Archive: Richard Lawhorn

I received a follow up comment from “An Old Navy Man” today.  He states:

“I guess Lawhorn will have to share underwear with Cole and Hellman now.  The Beltway rumor is that Vince Taylor was encouraged to move on.”


Original Post – story



There’s an old Navy story about a ship’s Captain who inspected his sailors.  Afterward he told the first mate that his men smelled bad.  Perhaps it would help if the sailors would change underwear occasionally.  The first mate responded “Aye, aye sir, I’ll see to it immediately!”


The first mate went straight to the sailor’s berth and announced, “The Captain thinks you guys smell bad and wants you to change your underwear.”  The first mate continued, “Watson, you change with Sterling.”  “Taylor you change with Cole.”  “Lawhorn you change with Hellmann.”


The moral of the story-   someone may come along and promise change, but don’t count on things smelling any better.


It’s time for the Office of the Secretary of Defense to hand the Industrial Security mission back to the Government Contracting Authorities.


From an old Navy man


Use this link to read article at the post and the comments following it:


Here are comments posted about this story as of 10-10-10:



DSS has long being the dumping ground for “entitled” personnel in the DOD that needed to be pushed up (promoted) but were not considered for vital national security positions. Following a push to rid the organization of the “old guard” (former DOD intelligence and security males) the Clinton Administration pushed for and got more women in upper management positions and as new hires. The old system of hiring military veterans from the intel and security arena no longer applied.

Consequently after many mishaps with the new management personnel pushing out the legacy staff, DSS went though a series of Directors, all without a clue to the actual mission of the service. The name was changed on a whim from the Defense Investigative Service to the Defense Security Service or DSS, thereby forcing the DOS’s Diplomatic Security Service (DSS) to change their acronym.

The dual mission of the service was never understood by management and the Industrial Security side of the service which had 15% of the service assets and its mission to protect government classified information at contractor facilities were shunted aside for the larger Investigations side of the house.

Only later when after a series of new directors (and new senior staff, usually old friends brought in) came the realization that the investigative side of the service (3,000 agents) would be going to OPM and all that would remain was the 500 or so Industrial Security Representatives. A realization was also made that the number of 500 field representatives could not justify the extremely high amount of SES, GS-15, and GS-14 positions at the headquarters of DSS.

At that point the decision was made to hire more field representatives, but instead allowed transfers from the investigative side to the industrial side.

What was not understood was that the experienced representatives had been pressured to retire early leaving only inexperienced reps and with the influx of investigative agents into the industrial side, there was no one left with any experience.

Also not understood by DSS management was that the years it takes to train a field rep. The industrial reps required years as a physical security, information security, computer security, signals or electronic security, as well as an understanding of business structures and the impact of foreign owners.This requires years of experience (think experience in military service).

What Kathleen Watson inherited was a dysfunctional agency with an inexperienced middle management and unknowing senior management.

The field reps on hand were largely inexperienced and untrained. Coupled with a management with an attitude, security issues were not recognized nor addressed, and unfortunately in many instances, ignored or covered up.

My suggestion would be to go back to the pre70’s approach to have each user agency with classified at contractor locations do their own security assessment.

Posted by: dodavatar | October 5, 2010 10:10 PM |


forget about classfied information, where will they get money for pens and paperclips?

Posted by: beltwaybandit2 | October 6, 2010 1:41 PM  


RECOMMENDATION:  A few years ago, the military departments (Army, Navy, Air Force) expressed their concerns about the performance of Defense Security Service (DSS) and proposing the disestablishment of DSS and having the military departments assume the security oversight of the contractors.The USD(I) looked at the proposal and decided to continue security oversight with DSS and to maintain the status quo. At the time, the military departments were not specific in how they would implement the security oversight.Maintaining DSS is the focus of its senior management and not the mission to protect the classified.There needs to be some consideration again to disbanding DSS and having the military administer their classified in the hands of cleared defense contractors. This may be the best alternative if DSS does not return to their stated mission and re-establish their integrity. As a veteran, taxpayer, & concerned citizen, it is recommended that DSS be disestablished and the military departments assume the functions and responsibility for the National Industrial Security Program (NISP) for these reasons:
ABUSE OF POWER:Former agency Dir. Kathleen Watson and her subordinates have successfully rid the organization of knowledgeable personnel. Watson actively participated in the ugly treatment of employees in this process. Her Director of Field Operations, Richard Lawhorn conducted the purge with malice and forethought. He doles out promotions or creates “do little” positions to keep his select employees beholden or “loyal” to him. Long time industrial security field staff or field office chiefs/middle managers with experience were shut out from promotions. Lawhorn’s management selectees have less than 2 years experience with DSS or are from the ranks of the unemployed and are desperate for a job. Once employed or promoted these persons may be called upon to lie about someone targeted for removal. Then another such beholden or “loyal” employee will swear to the lie and is subsequently rewarded with an appointment to a position such as Field Office Chief, Regional Director, or Deputy of this or that created SES position. This orchestrated duplicity is how Lawhorn has ensured the loyalty of his management staff. They are loyal to him for the sake of job retention and not mission driven. This environment is ripe for DCIPS abuse and that has already been demonstrated.
DSS has a daunting task with over 12,000 CDCs in the NISP and 400 field personnel to implement the program. There are another 400+ HQ employees and managers that never set foot in the field. The agency has been understaffed for years and minimal efforts have been made to actively recruit let alone retain qualified candidates. This has become a national security vulnerability.DSS needs to return to its mission of protecting the warfighter by securing the classified and be lead by persons with ethics and integrity; OR it needs to be dissolved and the mission returned to the military departments.

Posted by: TracyVerdi | October 6, 2010 11:15 PM


I agree with much of what dodavatar said. There are a couple of additions and clarifications I wish to add.

The period of time I view as the era of PSI trying to co-opt the entire agency, roughly from the early 1990’s to the mid 2000’s (reference the A-76 Studies). Even before PSI was sent off en masse to OPM, there were problems. In some cases, PSI employees with no understanding of the importance of the Industrial Security Mission were put in place as Office Chief’s of combined PSI/ISP offices.

There appeared to be some insider good old boys thing going on with at least some of those office chiefs. From what I have learned, a lot of waste, fraud, abuse and just plain arrogant irresponsible actions were committed during that time by them.

PSI managers made a run for ISP program money, and took it at will at the local/regional office level. ISP employees were left with insufficient funds to meet the requirements of their stated official mission. ISP reps were not given what they needed to do their jobs, and then were beat up by managers for not doing their jobs. There are many compelling and quite horrifying stories that employees from those years can relate.

These ISP reps suffered at the hands of these unqualified office chiefs, who made up what they did not know about the National Industrial Security Program with bullying and empire building.

This went on for some time, and no one in upper agency management did anything to address the problems, seemingly because the good old boy network extended into upper management. Richard Lawhorn was in management at that time, and was fully a part of those shenanigans. Some of the others were forced out or allowed to retire, as the corrupt and destructive management behavior continued. Richard Lawhorn is still there; it appears to me he has built himself an empire which has allowed him to remain pulling the strings and manipulating the workplace for the field offices, while directors have come and gone.

Hiring people who have the prerequisite knowledge, skills, ability and the aptitude and attitude to continue to learn new information, develop new specialized skills and expertise is extremely important in the type work that DSS ISR’s must do if they are to fulfil their real mission, as defined by Executive Order 12829 and delegated by OSD. I do not agree that military experience is necessarily the key to being a competent and skillful ISR. DSS has hired former military into ISR and other positions, but that background is not a guarantee of ability to excell in performing challenging ISR responsibilities.

The reinvention effort of the 1990’s though not all negative, opened the doors to major problems,of increasing influence of contractors on the inspection and oversight roles of DIS/DSS employees. It appeared to this observer that there was a a lot of revolving door use between DSS and defense contractors as well. Quality training in DSS has ceased to exist.

Posted by: gfs2010 | October 7, 2010 1:57 AM


If anyone can contribute to real factual information about past and present waste, fraud, and abuse within Defense Security Service, or other DoD agencies, please comment at the Washington Post article site, or email me at this site or you may go to Project On Government Oversight (pogo.org), and anonymously leave a message there for Nick Schwellenbach.  Ongoing investigations will be aided by additional reports of information and additional investigations could be inspired.  I believe there are a lot of you out there, including retired or former DoD employees who know a lot about these problems.   Thanks, GFS


The Washington Post

Can the Pentagon keep classified information safe?

The Pentagon agency responsible for making sure contractors are properly handling classified information is having a tough time doing its job.

The Defense Security Service (DSS) has had “recurring” troubles overseeing contractors, according to a November 2009 survey of agency employees. The Project on Government Oversight (POGO), a contracting watchdog group, got its hands on an internal agency e-mail, dated Sept. 16, that has employees saying they’re concerned about a “lack of resources” at DSS to “accomplish the mission.”

According to a source at DSS with whom POGO officials said they talked, the problems at DSS include having a lack of trained and experienced personnel who are “on-the-ground examining what systems contractors have in place to protect classified information.”

DSS is said to now be conducting a follow-up survey that asks employees, among other things, questions about having enough pens, paper clips and working copy machines. A source inside the agency has told POGO that the greater concern is not the agency’s office supplies but the lack of trained personnel.

With the government using more private contractors to help it do everything from run missile systems, maintain classified databases and analyze intelligence information on terrorist networks, POGO says the DSS report is worrisome.

“As the government’s secrets are increasingly placed in the hands of private companies we need to ensure that these companies can protect our nation’s crown jewels,” said Nick Schwellenbach, POGO’s director of investigations.

POGO points out that DSS’s outgoing director and the Government Accountability Office have said improvements need to be made at DSS.

Kathleen Watson, the director of DSS, who is expected to leave the agency this week, told Congress in April 2008: “When I came to this agency two years ago, it was broken across the board, and it took a year to figure out where the problems were and design a transformation plan. We just got our resources six months ago.

“This is an agency in transition,” she said. “It will be an agency in transition for as long as I am there. We have a lot of work to do; and, in my view, we have just started.”

In its audits of DSS, the GAO has raised concerns about DSS’s ability to ensure classified information is kept secure as contractors at some 11,000-plus facilities work with the Defense Department and dozens of other top-secret agencies. In one report, GAO auditors said DSS couldn’t “provide adequate assurances to government agencies that its oversight of contractor facilities reduces the risk of information compromise.”

It also said the agency didn’t follow proper procedures in reviewing 93 cases where a contractor reported a violation and possible compromise of classified information.

By Dana Hedgpeth  | October 5, 2010; 1:47 PM ET

 Link to original:  http://voices.washingtonpost.com/checkpoint-washington/2010/10/can_the_pentagon_keep_classifi.html

Be sure to check out the comments left for this article on the Washington Post,  f0und at the  bottom of the article.  -GFS

I have not been able to confirm this yet, but I hear through sources in the Beltway that multiple new criminal investigations have been launched into DSS management’s mode of operation.  Anyone know anything about this?  GFS

Update from a reader on 10-7-10:

“Some computers of DSS HQ senior management were seized by the Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS), so there may be a criminal case under investigation.

On another front, an investigation is being conducted by either DoD or DSS IG regarding timekeeping; not compensating staff for overtime work.  They are examining timesheets and other documents regarding duty hours; staff’s compressed work schedules.   They may be visiting every DSS office and interviewing everyone.”

This seems like a good time to remind everyone in DoD and in particular DSS,  to be even more conscientious than usual about not using work computers for personal emails or websurfing.  The individuals who have been committing these violations against federal employees are most likely becoming quite desperate as the pressure is building and the lights are beginning to be shined onto them wherever they are hiding.    GFS

Outgoing DSS Director, Kathleen (Kathy) Watson has stated in her farewell letter that the new acting Director of DSS in October when she leaves will be Barry Sterling.   -GFS

 As a start, here is what is posted on the Defense Security Service Website:

Barry E. Sterling

Chief Financial Officer

Defense Security Service

Barry E. Sterling, a member of the Senior Executive Service, is the Chief Financial Officer of the Defense Security Service. In this position, he is the primary advisor to the Director, DSS, in the areas of budget formulation, budget execution, financial management and policy, financial systems, and financial/cost reporting.  Additionally, he provides executive leadership to the agency’s safety, logistics, nationwide facility management programs, the Strategic Management Office, and manages the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Program.  Prior to this assignment, Mr. Sterling was assigned to the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Counterintelligence and Security (DUSD(I) CI&S) where he formulated and executed the DUSDI financial program and provided financial oversight of the Defense Security Service and The Counterintelligence Field Activity.

Mr. Sterling is a retired U. S. Air Force Officer who during his Air Force career performed management assistance services, spearheaded Wing and Command level Management Information Programs, cost and economic analysis, and developed and administered cost analysis policy for 120 analysts at Headquarters Air Education and Training Command (AETC) and its 13 bases; interpreted, clarified and supplemented Air Force guidance on budget policy and procedures, tracked congressional, DoD and Air Force budget actions and developed the AETC financial plan and oversaw the execution of over $4 Billion in multiple appropriations.

Mr. Sterling commanded the 325th Comptroller Squadron where he provided financial services, budgeting and accounting of 34 appropriations exceeding $360 million.  He also served as a Senior Financial Manager, Secretary of the Air Force Financial Management, performing strategic planning activities and conceived and managed manpower policy for all 13,000 Air Force Financial Management and Comptroller positions Air Force wide.

He served as the Comptroller and Director of Financial Management for Headquarters Air Force Office of Special Investigations (HQ AFOSI) where he developed and defended a $325 million budget supporting Counterintelligence, Counterespionage, Force Protection and Security and investigative activities.  He was the Secretary of the Air Force Inspector General’s (IG) representative to the Headquarters Air Force Resource Management program providing oversight and input to SAF/IG’s financial program and provided oversight to the (HQ AFOSI) and Air Force Inspection Agency.  He also was the SAF/IG representative to the USAF Group and USAF Board representing SAF/IG input into the Air Force Corporate Structure making resource decisions affecting all Air Force entities upon his retirement from active duty.

Prior to his military career, Mr Sterling was a Vice President/Branch Manager for a large Florida Bank managing all branch financial operations. He has had a 30-year career in financial management.  He holds a Bachelor’s degree from the University of Maryland and a Master’s degree from Central Michigan University both in business.  He also holds a Florida Bankers Association School of Banking Branch Management Institute degree.

Current as of September 2009

Here is a new blog post by Nick Schwellenbach.  Enjoy.  A link to POGO, the origin of this post, is at the bottom after DSS Director Watson’s goodbye letter.  GFS

Sep 16, 2010

Defense Security Service Director Leaving for “the Private Sector”

In an email (see below) to the staff of Defense Security Service (DSS) on Monday afternoon, the agency’s director, Kathleen M. Watson, announced she would be retiring next month “to pursue a career in the private sector,” though where exactly she did not say. If her actions are like those of some of her predecessors at DSS who have gone on to work in the private sector, she may soon be working for a government contractor whom she once oversaw in her role at DSS.

DSS is the Pentagon agency responsible for ensuring that government contractors have systems in place needed to protect classified information in accordance with the National Industrial Security Program. The little-known agency has been the subject of some of POGO’s work over the years, namely POGO’s unearthing of a Pentagon inspector general report that said the agency did not properly oversee BAE System’s protection of classified information in the Joint Strike Fighter program (JSF). The Pentagon Inspector General later retracted the report when it was found that the report’s conclusions were not fully backed up by evidence.

Looking at DSS more broadly, Congress’s investigative arm, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), has said DSS has systemic problems overseeing contractors in two reports—once in 2004 and later in 2005. In testimony before the House Armed Services Committee on April 16, 2008, DSS Director Kathleen Watson herself admitted that when she began as director in 2007, DSS was “broken across the board.”

But where is she going next? If past is prologue, then she may be gunning for a job with a government contractor.
For example, one of DSS’s previous directors, Lt. Gen. Charles J. Cunningham Jr., who left in May 2002, went to DynCorp International in November of that year to become its director of Air Force Strategic Programs, according to a DynCorp press release.

Another senior DSS official, Gregory Gwash, DSS’s deputy director until July 1997, went on to work for a company that DSS oversees: Boeing, the U.S.’s second largest defense contractor and one trusted with many of the military’s cutting edge secrets. In his farewell message, which was obtained by Steven Aftergood of the Federation of American Scientists, Gwash used the same kind of government-industry partnership rhetoric praised in the Clinton and Bush years, but now seen as helping to create the rubber stamp, “service oriented” oversight culture at agencies like the Minerals Management Service (MMS—now known as the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation, and Enforcement) and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Gwash wrote of some of the highlights of his time at DSS, including the “partnership” between government and industry and “the reinvention of the Industrial Security Program from a compliance-based activity to a service oriented, threat based program.”

No one disagrees that government and industry have to work together closely—POGO just thinks that they’ve been far too cozy for too long. When top government officials don’t want to ruin their chances for a lucrative job in private industry, how hard will they push on their potential future employers when they’re in the government?

Earlier this year, The Washington Post’s “Top Secret America” investigation did a good job exposing the extent to which private companies are handling some of our nation’s most sensitive intelligence and national security functions. But the Post‘s discovery that more contractors are handling secrets than ever before raises the question: Is the key agency overseeing how well companies protect our secrets doing its job appropriately? And is its senior management keeping an arm’s length distance from those it is overseeing?

–Nick Schwellenbach

Text from Watson’s email:

—– Original Message —–
From: Watson, Kathy, DISES, DSS
Sent: Mon Sep 13 16:42:13 2010 Subject: Farewell

It is with a tremendous amount of trepidation that I have decided to leave DSS to pursue a career in the private sector. My decision making process was long and hard because working with all of you has been enlightening, humbling and a lot of fun. I respect DSS, its mission, and more importantly, all of you. The work is rewarding, critical to our national security and a reminder of just how fragile we may be as a nation on any given day.

My last day at DSS will be 8 October. Barry Sterling, our very able CFO and colleague, will serve as the Acting Director upon my departure. I would ask that you all continue to do what you do so well — focus on the mission and keep making DSS a better place every day you come to work. We have come a long way as an organization in the last four years, but there is still much to be done. I will be watching as you all continue to accelerate and enhance the mission and image of DSS.

Thanks to all of you for the fine support, comraderie and just plain hard work. And remember, DSS is yours and will be what you make of it.

Take care and my best to all of you.

Kathy Watson

Link to original at POGO:  http://pogoblog.typepad.com/pogo/2010/09/defense-security-service-director-leaving-for-the-private-sector.html

I received this recently from an anonymous source.  I can understand why so many people wish to remain anonymous with all the mistreatment of federal employees going on out there.  Considering the changes happening at the highest levels in DSS recently, it seems to me that the comments of this reader are worth considering carefully.  GFS


G Florence,

The Joint Strike Fighter, BAE and DSS article by Nick Schwellenbach, which you reference, is a good investigative report.  Thank you for posting it on your blog.  DSS’s problems are not yet adequately addressed. 

The report just scratches the surface of a large and systemic problem in DSS.  Director Kathleen Watson told the OIG that “DSS has a thorough and fundamentally sound facility inspection process which was only marginally diminished by the failure to systematically collect, analyze, and retain BAE’s required reports.” 

As the director, Kathy Watson paid the price for bad DSS inspection work and sloppy documentation.  The problem has not gone away with Kathy Watson leaving DSS.  The real problems and responsibilities rest upon the shoulders of Rick Lawhorn, the DSS Director of Field Operations.  To the public and the defense contractors Rick Lawhorn eloquently speaks to quality and timeliness of inspections and inspection reports.  But in reality, Lawhorn has stressed “metrics” or numbers to his DSS regional directors and field office chiefs. 

Many Action Officer positions and deputy management positions were created to micromanage the industrial security representatives doing the inspection work.  It seems like there are more managers sitting around staring at an ever-increasing number of individual manager created Excel spreadsheets than there are field people doing the work.

This has created a DSS management atmosphere where everything becomes top priority, and everything must be done in a timely fashion.  It is not possible to do everything all at once, particularly when more and more is being added to the list and the work force is still insufficient for the workload. 

This has also created an atmosphere where employees are working many undocumented hours to try to remain successful at their jobs.  This environment has lead to employee burnout and high turnover within many of the DSS field offices. 

DSS management and Rick Lawhorn seem to believe that there is a limitless supply of highly trained industrial security representatives just waiting for the opportunity to work for DSS, so the pattern of heavy-handed DSS micromanagement of employees continues on, chasing more and more people who have knowledge and experience out of DSS.

Former and current DSS employees have reported many of these instances to the DoD inspector general’s office.  The DoD inspector general’s office seems to have a high success rate of dismissing these reports without further investigation, which points to another Nick Schwellenbach article that you reference about the DoD inspector general’s office failing in its mission.  Nick Schwellenbach’s article references a Senator Grassley report that says the DoD IG in numerous instances has failed to follow up on serious evidence of wrongdoing, especially in the vulnerable area of defense contracting.

Another Former DSS Employee

Here are a couple of excerpts from a post at POGO regarding BAE, Joint Strike Fighter, and the failure of Defense Security Service in protecting matters of National Security.  Later it is correctly stated that there are problems with DSS’s performance as the watchdog in charge of ensuring BAE was adequately protecting classified information and includes soon to be past Director, Kathleen Watson’s inexplicable comments and excuses for her agencies failures.  Please follow the link to read the whole story and to take a look at the other excellent reports on POGO’s website.  (http://pogo.org

Note:  This is not the only documented case of this type of problem.  I am told that there are others, involving DSS and other contractors.  -GFS


A “Black Eye” for the Pentagon’s Watchdog: The Backstory of the BAE-Joint Strike Fighter Audit Report Withdrawal

By Nick Schwellenbach

“The findings were troubling to say the least. In spring 2008, British Aerospace Enterprises, the U.K.’s largest defense contractor better known by its initials BAE, had been accused by the Pentagon watchdog agency of possibly losing classified information related to the world’s most expensive weapons program,  the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF).

This tale did not end here.”  



“On top of findings related to BAE the OIG’s report contained arguably equally troubling, yet less well-publicized findings that a little-known Pentagon agency had failed in its job to ensure that BAE was adequately protecting classified information. Questions about the effectiveness of the Defense Security Service (DSS) in overseeing contractors had been bubbling to the surface since a 2004 Government Accountability Office report—but this was the first real example of the agency’s inadequacy to come to light.”

‘In its defense, DSS Director Kathleen Watson told the OIG that “DSS has a thorough and fundamentally sound facility inspection process which was only marginally diminished by the failure to systematically collect, analyze, and retain BAE’s required reports.”’

Follow Link to complete story:  http://pogoblog.typepad.com/pogo/2010/09/a-black-eye-for-the-pentagons-watchdog-the-backstory-of-the-bae-joint-strike-fighter-audit-report-wi.html

I hear from my beltway sources that today, Kathleen (Kathy) Watson announced that she was leaving as Director of Defense Security Service.  I understand she did not announce what her next endeavor would be.  Those that are curious about such things should be watching closely.  There has been a pattern of people leaving DSS and taking lucrative defense contractor jobs with contractors that have been “overseen” by DSS. 

I hope the Department of Defense Inspector General’s Office is paying attention and will continue to investigate such things and keep an eye on where she goes and under what sort of agreement. 

And by the way, someone should also be looking closely at Richard Lawhorn, who has been very skillful I hear at keeping himself below the radar, with plausible deniability.  Directors have come and gone; Lawhorn has remained.

DSS Employees Face Growing Reprisal and Abuse

I have been informed by several people that the Defense Security Service is continuing to assign employees to remote locations and load them down with way too much work to complete in the time allotted for the temporary duty assignment location. Federal workers have been expected to put in full days of inspections, and then spend many hours each night working on the paperwork and reports. Pressure is put on them to work these unpaid overtime hours, though no overtime pay is offered or requests for same accepted. Employees are being threatened or intimidated by insinuation of ratings of unsatisfactory by managers if they will not shut up and do this.

This is called “Forced Overtime” and is illegal. To demand your employees work hours beyond their scheduled paid work day, or 40 hour work week without pay, is wrong. We have labor laws to protect workers from that. Obviously some managers and agency directors must think they are above the law.

The other problem, I am told in the case of DSS by my beltway sources, is that they are using taxpayer dollars in an imprudent manner. DSS managers are sending people from various offices around to other offices to do remote work there. By example, if some employees in a Virginia office are pulled out and sent to a California office to one of the offices there, and at the same time some employees are sent from that California office to that same Virginia office, there is only a trade of location of personnel.

The effective difference is when sent on these forced TDY’s the employees are told they must fly out Sunday or Monday early, do all of the work tasked at the remote assignment site, including reports, and must have everything completed before they will be allowed to get on a plane to go home Friday night. (I guess if your employees are working at their home office where they live, it is not so easy to demand all of this unpaid overtime, as people can just go home at the end of their work day in their own cars, and don’t have to rely on government paid airplane tickets, or deal with threats about leaving before they’ve done all the unpaid overtime.

This kind of demand seems to be being made most heavily on already understaffed and overworked offices. Those that can least afford to have time pulled away from their already overwhelming workload are the most heavily hit. One theory is that this is being done intentionally as retribution toward a whole office and its employees, and a lot of the frenzy is the use of smoke and mirrors to try to cover up how some people and offices are being targeted. If this is happening to you, please let me know.

Also, I know many of you are being terrorized and are afraid to stand up. I would suggest that at this time you NOT send in a hotline report to the DSS (Defense Security Service) IG hotline. Please contact the overall DoD IG and if you are complaining about abuse of employees or harassment and retaliation, contact the Reprisal Office that handles Title V employee reprisal issues. Other things you may wish to report may be reported also, but if they are criminal in nature, cannot be handled by the Reprisal office. They will probably forward them to the appropriate officials if asked to do so by you.

I don’t know all of the details. I really would like to know why this is happening and if it is happening everywhere in DSS. I would also like to know if it is happening in other DoD agencies or even agencies outside of DoD.

If you have any clarity on this issue, please comment. It seems that this agency in particular, (DSS), is committing major waste, fraud and abuse, if all of this is going on. Especially in today’s economic mess, taxpayers do not need certain government agency directors and managers wasting more of the taxpayer’s money.

If there is anyone in the IG’s or Justice Department still actually doing their job it should be stopped now! If you can, please get in your two cents worth. Thanks, GFS